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In model-based development of reactive systems, 
statecharts are widely used for formal design of system 
behavior, and provide a sound basis for analysis and 
verification tools, as well as for code generation from 
system models. We present an approach for dynamic 
analysis of reactive systems via run-time verification of 
code produced with Statemate C and MicroC code 
generators  [10],  [15].  The core of the approach is 
automatic creation of monitoring statecharts from 
formulas that specify the system's behavioral properties in 
a proposed assertion language. Such monitors are then 
translated into code together with the system model, and 
executed concurrently with the system code. This 
approach leads to a more realistic analysis of reactive 
systems, as monitoring is supported in the system's actual 
operating environment. For models that include design-
level attributes (division into tasks, etc.), this is crucial for 
performance-related checks, and helps to overcome 




Development of reliable reactive systems is a 
significant challenge, especially due to their complex 
behavior. There has been a great deal of research on the 
development of formal methods for specification, design, 
analysis and verification of reactive systems.  
For precise specification of system behavioral 
properties, various types of temporal logic are widely 
used. These include LTL  [14], which offers special 
temporal operators for reasoning about past and future 
properties of behavioral sequences, and MTL  [5], which 
supports expression of real-time constraints through 
definition of duration for future temporal operators. Some 
specification formalisms suggest various kinds of syntax 
sugar that make the specification task more user friendly 
for designers who are not logicians. For example, with the 
LA language in  [18], temporal properties look as a 





In  [3], the temporal logic details are hidden "behind the 
scenes", and instead, patterns are used that allow to specify 
common properties (such as existence, absence, response, 
precedence, etc.) and scope in which the property should 
hold. This approach is used, for example, in a Statemate 
verification tool called ModelCertifier  [16] that offers a 
rich library of pre-defined property patterns, where each 
pattern looks as a parameterized natural language 
sentence. Paper  [6] introduces a language for pattern 
definition as a way to create extendable sets of property 
patterns. Sugar  [19] provides several layers for property 
specification and verification; in particular, extended 
regular expressions are used to describe execution 
sequences on which temporal properties are checked. 
On the other hand, model-based system development 
has become the way to design, implement and validate 
reactive systems. Statecharts, first introduced in  [9], have 
become a standard for behavior design in popular model-
based methodologies such as structured and object-
oriented design  [7]. Various tools (e.g., Statemate  [10], 
Rhapsody  [9], BetterState  [20]) support the creation of 
executable models using statecharts, and their analysis 
through simulation, execution of automatically generated 
code, and, in Statemate, verification. Ongoing research on 
model-based testing covers, among other issues, test 
generation from statechart models  [4].  
One powerful method of dynamic analysis is run-time 
monitoring of system execution. A number of tools have 
been developed for monitoring various types of programs 
(including real-time systems); see, for example  [1],  [2], 
 [18]. The relevant assertion languages allow for 
expressing a wide range of properties in terms of events 
that occur in the running code, and for defining tool 
reactions when a violation is found or when the run was 
successful. An important problem here is the gap between 
the system specification, which usually refers to high-level 
objects, and monitors, which refer to implementation-level 
events (such as function calls, etc.). Some issues related to 
derivation of monitors from system specification are 
considered in  [17].  
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Model-based development leads to a narrowing of this 
gap, as monitoring can be performed on the model (rather 
than the implementation) level. Statemate  [10] supports 
the use of the so-called watchdog (testbench) statechart. 
Such a chart is not part of the system model; its role is 
either that of a driver (acting as an environment and 
producing system inputs) or a monitor (watching the 
system for proper behavior or abnormalities). To perform 
its role, the watchdog is executed in parallel with the 
model. Violation of the monitored property can be 
expressed and observed as entering an error state in the 
monitor chart. For example, Fig. 1 shows a simple 
statechart for monitoring the following requirement: 
"Processing of a request must be accomplished within 5 
seconds, and before receiving the next request".   
 
An important feature of monitor statecharts is that they 
have access to all elements in the system model. In other 
words, visibility from the monitor is supported both for 
observable elements (events, conditions and data items) 
that belong to system's interface with the environment, and 
for internal elements such as states or events used for 
internal communication between system components. This 
allows for both black box and more detailed white box 
monitoring, and makes localization of design problems 
easier. 
 
2. What is in this paper 
 
This paper presents an approach to dynamic analysis of 
reactive systems modeled with statecharts using Statemate. 
The basic goal here is to reveal errors (rather than to 
validate or show correctness). 
The analysis is based on run-time monitoring of code 
generated from the system model. The code is checked 
against the system specification describing the required 
and forbidden behaviors; these are expressed in a proposed 
assertion language described below. The main idea 
underlying this approach is the automatic creation of 
monitors directly from the system specification. This is 
achieved through translation of the specification into an 
equivalent watchdog statechart(s). This step is followed by 
generating code from the system model and from the 
created monitor (using the existing Statemate C code 
generator), and their simultaneous execution. Appropriate 
diagnostics  is produced during the execution and/or upon  
its completion.  
The suggested approach has a number of advantages, 
and is especially helpful in situations where the use of 
other analysis tools (e.g. of model checkers such as 
Statemate ModelCertifier  [16]) becomes problematic:  
- There is no restriction on the size of the tested model, 
and execution of compiled code (for model and monitor) is 
fast. On the other hand, model checking may become slow 
for very large real-world models.    
- Generated code for the system and its monitor is 
executed in real time. Even though such code is usually 
considered prototype quality, it is fast enough and allows 
for meaningful checks of time constraints (unless they are 
tighter than the code performance). Such checks are 
beyond the scope of simulation and model checking tools 
that are based on simulated time schemes described in 
 [12]: synchronous (for clock-driven systems) and 
asynchronous (for event-driven systems). In the 
synchronous scheme duration of all steps is the same, 
regardless of how "heavy" the executed actions are. In the 
asynchronous scheme, steps take zero time, and the system 
executes a chain of steps until stabilization; only then is 
the clock advanced and inputs accepted. These 
abstractions are based on the assumption that the system is 
fast enough to complete its reactions to external stimuli 
before the next stimulus arrives. Real time monitoring 
allows one to check whether this assumption is correct. 
- Our approach allows monitoring of code generated 
from the Statemate model augmented by design attributes 
(showing the system division into tasks of various types, 
mapping model elements into events of the target RTOS, 
etc.). For such models, the MicroC code generator  [15] 
automatically creates a highly optimized production 
quality code for the OSEK operating system, widely used 
in the automotive industry for embedded microcontroller 
development. Thus the code can be executed and 
monitored in its realistic hardware-in-the-loop operating 
environment. This kind of analysis is impossible with 
model checking. 
- Model checking requires that all data be properly 
restricted, to guarantee that a finite state model is 
analyzed. This requirement is problematic for input data, if 
there is not enough information about the system 
environment. No such restrictions are relevant for 
monitoring, and moreover, monitored code derived from 
the system model can be connected to real sources of input 
data.    
 
3. Assertion language 
 
To specify and monitor real-time properties of reactive 
systems, we use an assertion language that integrates a 
number of powerful features found in temporal logic and 
in FORMAN language (the latter was introduced in  [1], 
 [2], and is used  in a number of tools): 
- Boolean expressions can refer to any elements in the 
system model, and express properties of system 
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configurations. For example: in(S) and (x>5) means that 
currently the system is in state S and x is greater than 5.  
- Regular expressions allow for description of state 
sequences. Consider for example, the expression: 
[SELECT (Open | Read | Write | Close) FROM ex_program ] 
SATISFY Open (Read | Write )* Close 
This assertion requires to select execution trace states 
matching one of the given patterns, and to check the 
sequence of selected states for conformance with the 
regular expression. 
- Temporal formulas express order properties fulfilled 
by system execution sequences. They are built using 
unrestricted future temporal operators NEXT, ALWAYS, 
EVENTUALLY, UNTIL and their past counterparts: 
PREVIOUS, ALWAYS_WAS, SOMETIME_WAS, SINCE. 
Following  [14], we consider formulas for the following types of 
properties (where P is a past formula): 
   Safety: ALWAYS (P)   
   Guarantee: EVENTUALLY (P) 
   Obligation: Boolean combination of safety and guarantee 
   Response: ALWAYS (EVENTUALLY(P) ) 
   Persistence: EVENTUALLY (ALWAYS(P) ) 
   Reactivity: Boolean combination of response and persistence. 
According to  [14], any temporal formula is equivalent to a 
reactivity formula; the other five types of formulas are 
allowed for more flexibility.  For convenient expression of 
real-time constraints, we support also a restricted version of 
the above operators; it is obtained by attaching appropriate 
time characteristics. For example, ALWAYS(10)P  means 
that P is continuously true during 10 time units after the 
current moment, while SOMETIME_WAS (10) P denotes that 
P was true at least once in the 10 previous time moments. 
With this extension, P in the above formulas is now 
allowed to be a restricted (future or past) formula. Note 
that we don't allow an unrestricted temporal operator to be 
nested within a restricted one. 
- Actions define what should be done when a property 
violation is found, or when the property holds for the 
checked run. Typically, this includes sending an 
appropriate message. In general, any user-defined 
functions can be used here to provide a meaningful report 
that may include, for example, interesting statistics and 
other profiling information (frequency of occurrence for 
certain event, total time spent by the system in certain 
state, etc.). For this, actions can use the appropriate 
attributes of the referred objects (e.g., the time at which a 
certain interval was entered). 
The examples in section 4 illustrate the use of this 
assertion language. Since the language is based on 
constructs described elsewhere (see  [14],  [12] and  [1]), 
detailed description of its syntax and semantics is omitted 
from this paper. Nevertheless, one delicate issue should be 
mentioned here. System specification usually assumes 
infinite execution sequences (as a reactive system has an 
ongoing interaction with its environment). 
Correspondingly, the traditional semantics of temporal 
operators is also defined for infinite execution sequences. 
However, monitoring usually deals with finite (truncated) 
runs, and this requires a proper definition of the semantics 
for cases when there is doubt as to what would have been 
the property formula value if the execution had not been 
stopped. Paper  [7] studies several ways of reasoning with 
temporal logic on truncated executions. We follow the so 
called neutral view discussed in  [7]; this is illustrated by 
the following example. Consider the assertions: 
   ALWAYS (P Æ EVENTUALLY (10) Q) 
   ALWAYS (P Æ ALWAYS (10) Q)  
and suppose that the run is completed (truncated) 4 
seconds after the last occurrence of event P (we assume 
that each of the properties held for all earlier occurrences 
of P).  If there was no Q after the last P, then the first 
assertion is considered to be false for this run (even though 
continuation of the run could reveal that Q does occur in 
10 seconds after P, as required).  On the contrary, if Q held 
continuously after the last P and until the end of the run, 
then the second assertion is considered to be true. In 
general, it is the user's responsibility to make the on-satisfy 
and on-failure actions detailed enough, so that he can 
better understand the monitoring results (e.g. whether a 
real violation was found, or it is in doubt due to the state at 




To illustrate our approach, we consider the Early 
Warning System (EWS) example from  [12]. We present 
its verbal description followed by the statechart presenting 
the behavioral design of the system. We then give 
examples of assertions and, for one of them, show its 
translation into a monitor statechart according to our 
translation scheme.  
The EWS receives a signal from an external source. 
When the sensor is connected, the EWS performs signal 
sampling every 5 seconds; it processes the sampled signal 
and checks whether the resulting value is within a 
specified range. If the value is out of range, the system 
issues a warning message on the operator display. If the 
operator does not respond to this warning within a given 
time interval (15 seconds), the system prints a fault 
message and stops monitoring the signal. The range limits 
are set by the operator. The system is ready to start 
monitoring the signal only after the range limits are set. 
The limits can be redefined after an out-of-range situation 
has been detected, or after the operator has deliberately 
stopped the monitoring. 
Fig. 2 shows a statechart describing the EWS, similar 
to the one in  [12]. The main part of EWS behavior is 
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detailed in state ON. It contains two AND-components that 
represent the EWS controller and the sensor acting 
concurrently.  Events DO_SET_UP, EXECUTE, and RESET 
represent the commands that can be issued by the operator. 
Timing requirements are represented by delays that trigger 
the corresponding transitions. The AND-components can 
communicate; for example, see event CONNECT_OFF sent 
from the controller component to the sensor component. 
Following are four examples of assertions that reflect 
some of the above requirements for EWS: 
1)   ALWAYS (EXECUTE Æ SOMETIME_WAS (DO_SET_UP))  
(monitoring of signal should be preceded by setting range 
limits) 
2)   ALWAYS (OUT_OF_RANGE Æ 
       EVENTUALLY (15) (RESET or started(PRINT_ALARM)) 
(in the out-of-range situation, within 15 seconds either the 
operator responds or a fault message is printed) 
3)   ALWAYS ( 
      ALWAYS_WAS (15) (in(DISPLAY_ALARM) & not RESET)   
     Æ   started(PRINT_ALARM))  
(a similar property, this time expressed using the past 
temporal operator)  
4)   ALWAYS (FINISHED_SAMPLING Æ   
  ALWAYS (5) in(IDLE)  or EVENTUALLY(5)CONNECT_OFF)  
(after signal sampling is finished, there is a 5-second pause 
before the next sampling, unless the sensor is 
disconnected)   
Note that the first assertion is violated for the given 
statechart; this happens in the following scenario: 
POWER_ON; CONNECT_ON; EXECUTE. The other 
assertions are valid as long as the system remains in its ON 
state (i.e., POWER_OFF doesn't occur), but otherwise can 
be violated.  
Fig. 3 shows how the second of these four assertions is 
translated into a monitor statechart. Suppose POWER_OFF 
occurs 7 seconds after OUT_OF_RANGE, and there was no 
RESET in this interval. If the system remains in state OFF 
for at least the following 8 seconds, then the monitor will 
enter its state D, thus indicating a violation of the 
monitored assertion.  
 
5. Implementation Outline 
 
Statemate Boolean expressions obtained from basic 
predicates (like in(DISPLAY_ALARM)), guarding conditions, 
and event occurrences are directly visible from monitor 
statechart; in this sense, their monitoring is trivial. In 
monitors created to watch temporal and timing properties, 
such expressions can be used as transition triggers, similar 
to the example in Fig.1.  
In the rest of this section, we present an outline of a 
translation scheme for restricted and unrestricted temporal 
formulas allowed by our assertion language (see section 3 
above). Though not fully formalized here, the presentation 
clearly shows the technique used for generation of 
monitors from assertions.  
Let P, Q, S denote basic Boolean formulas, which do 
not contain any temporal operators, and let FRM denote 
any formula.  
Then P Æ Q means that P is used as a trigger to start 
monitoring of formula Q; for each occurrence of P, a new 
thread of Q monitoring should be started. Absence of the 
trigger (PÆ …) means that the start of execution is the 
only trigger event. 
If a formula includes only restricted future temporal 
operators, like in 
FRM ≡  P Æ TL_Operator (N1) TL_Operator (N2) …. 
TL_Operator (Nk ) S  
then its value becomes known after (i.e. it needs to be 
monitored during), at most,    t(FRM) = N1 + N2 + … + Nk 
time units from the triggering event P. For example: 
            PÆ ALWAYS(5) EVENTUALLY(10) S 
is monitored during, at most, 15 time units from the 
triggering event P. For each step within the monitoring 
interval we have to know the Boolean values of all basic 
sub-formulas in the FRM. This is sufficient to determine, 
after t(FRM) time units, whether FRM is true or false for the 
particular occurrence of the trigger event P.  
Every restricted future formula is translated into a chart 
containing two designated states: accepting state F, and 
rejecting state D; there are no transitions exiting from F 
and D in such a chart. The value of the formula is true 
when computation ends in F, and false when it ends in D. 
If execution of the monitored system is truncated before 
completion of the formula computation, then (in the spirit 
of the neutral view as defined in  [7]) the value is decided 
to be true for the ALWAYS-formula and false for the 
EVENTUALLY-formula. 
As an illustration, Fig. 4 schematically shows the 
translation pattern for FRM≡ALWAYS (N) P, where P itself 
is either a basic or a restricted future formula. Translation 
is defined by structured induction, starting from the case 
when P is a basic formula. Note that each advance of the 
clock by one time unit causes a new thread of computation 
for P to be started. Each thread is represented in the chart 
by a separate AND-component; there are N such 
components. This number is known based on an analysis 
of the translated formula. 
Fig. 5 shows a translation pattern for a safety assertion 
where the unrestricted operator ALWAYS is applied to the 
restricted formula P (the actual structure of state P in each 
thread is defined by translation rules for restricted 
formulas). In this case, as long as P holds the value true, 
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we should continue the ongoing computation of P. 
Whenever the monitor enters its D state, the value of the 
formula becomes false; otherwise (including the case of 
truncated execution), the value is true. Note that since 
obtaining a value of P may require up to t(P) time units, 
there are t(P) threads computing P. When a cycle of P 
computation is completed with the value true (the 
component reaches its F state), it is restarted again. Also 
note the delays: RESTART_P_i is defined in such a way that 
with each advance of the clock by one time unit, a new 
cycle of P computation is started. Restarting P 
immediately upon its completion in state F would have 
caused a violation of such synchronization in case a 
certain cycle takes less time than t(P). This, in turn, could 
lead to wrong computation of the entire formula.  
To implement EVENTUALLY (ALWAYS(P)), we have to 
restart computation of ALWAYS(P) whenever it gets the 
value false, i.e., when the chart in Fig. 5 enters state D (at 
the top level of the hierarchy). In other words, such 
implementation can be obtained by redirecting the 
transition from D back to the AND-state.  
Implementation of dual formulas (where ALWAYS is 
replaced by EVENTUALLY and vice versa) is similar to the 
described above, with appropriate replacement of F-states 
by D-states and vice versa.  
For restricted past formulas we need to monitor only 
the finite segment of the execution in order to decide 
whether the formula is true or false. Consider, for 
example, ALWAYS_WAS (N) P which means "during N time 
units preceding the current moment, P was continuously 
true". Implementation uses a counter CP associated with 
the formula; on each advance of the clock, if P is true then 
CP is incremented, and if P is false then CP is set to 0. 
Now ALWAYS_WAS (N) P is true at the current moment, iff 
CP=N.  
Similarly, for SOMETIME_WAS (N) P that means "from 
the current moment in at least N previous steps P was true 
at least once", the implementation will use the counter CP 
in the following way: On each advance of the clock, if P is 
true then CP is set to N, and if P is false then CP is 
decremented by 1. Now, SOMETIME_WAS (N) P is true at 
the current moment, iff CP > 0 at the current moment. 
 
6. Conclusions and future work 
 
The paper presents an approach to dynamic analysis of 
reactive systems via run-time verification of code 
generated from Statemate models.  The approach is based 
on the automatic creation of monitoring statecharts from 
formulas that specify the system's temporal and real-time 
properties in a proposed assertion language. The 
promising advantage of this approach is in its ability to 
analyze realistic models (with attributes reflecting the 
various design decisions) in the system's realistic 
environment.  This capability is beyond the scope of 
simulation and model checking tools.  
Several experiments have been carried out, that 
included manual creation of monitor charts from assertion 
formulas and their use with C code generated from 
Statemate models (EWS considered in section 4, and some 
others). This helped in a more accurate definition of the 
translation scheme. 
The natural next step is actual implementation of the 
translation from the assertion language into statechart 
monitors, which is the core of the suggested approach, and 
use of created monitors with real-world system models.   
The assertion language needs to be more convenient 
for designers. A possible way to achieve this is to adopt 
some of the ideas discussed in  [3],  [6],  [18],  [19]. This will 
require an appropriate adaptation of the translation 
scheme.  
The system described above for statechart run time 
monitoring is under development. The suggested 
translation scheme provides a uniform mechanism for 
automatic creation of monitors, although some examples 
show that, in certain cases, more compact and optimized 
monitors can be produced. Further research is needed to 
define a more efficient translation scheme, both for 
synchronous and asynchronous time models. 
Finally, an interesting challenge is to check a similar 
approach with a UML-based design paradigm that uses an 
OO version of statecharts for behavior description. Here 
an additional advantage could be in monitoring of systems 
where objects are created dynamically such that their 
amount is not limited in advance (model checking analysis 
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Figure 3. Monitor chart for the assertion  
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 Figure 5. Translation pattern for formula ALWAYS  P 
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F  D  
IDLE  
/RES:=false  
dly(N)/   RES:=true  not P 
/RES:=false 
Maximum time needed to compute value   
of  formula FRM:  
        
  t(FRM) = N  
 
Computation may finish in less than N time units  
Case 1:   
-------  P a is basic formula 
Maximum time needed to compute value of formula FRM:  
t(FRM) = N + t(P)  
Case 2:  
-------P contains only restricted temporal operators                  
All components 
are in F / RES:=true 
At least one component  
is in D / RES:=false 




F D  
START_P 
IDLE 
RESTART_P_N/  RES:=true  
dly(N)/ TN:=CURR_TIME  
COMP_0  
P  
F  D  
START_P  
RESTART_P_0/   RES:=true  










F  D  
START_P  
IDLE  
RESTART_P_1/   RES:=true  




P is a resticted formula:  t(P) = N             ===================================             
RESTART_P_i = dly(N - mod(CURR_TIME-Ti, N))                                              At least one                            component is in D /                                RES:=false              
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